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Such special administrator shall not be liable to an action by any creditor of the
deceased, and the time for limitation of all suits against the estate shall begin to
run from the time of granting letters testamentary or of administration in the
usual form, in like manner as if such special administration had not been granted.
The supreme court held that the trial court was correct in sustaining respondent's
demurrer to the complaint, and affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the complaint. The case is consistent with two previous Washington cases: In re Hohn's
Estate, 141 Wash. 475, 252 Pac. 145 (1927), and Ward v. Magaha, 71 Wash. 679, 129
Pac. 395 (1913), which both held that a special administrator has no power to exercise the powers and duties conferred upon a regular administrator, such as the allowance of claims. The cases all emphasize the fact that a special administrator is authorized to do little other than collect and preserve the effects of the deceased pending
appointment of a personal representative.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Longshoremen's Act-Right to Sue Fellow Employees. Can an
employee covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act' sue his fellow employee? The Washington Supreme
Court in Ginnis v. Southerland' has said no. In that case a longshoreman, injured while working on the S.S. Santa Anita, owned by the
Grace Lines, Inc., elected to sue the master of the vessel rather than
receive compensation under the act. Southerland, the master, did
not deny his alleged personal negligence but raised the defense that he
was an agent of the Grace Lines, Inc., which was also the employer of
the injured workman. He claimed that since his employer was immune
under the compensation act,3 he, as agent, shared the Grace Lines'
immunity. The court held that the acts of the agent were the acts of
the employer because he acted through his employer." Thus, the
master was not a third person under section 933 of the act,5 which
permits the workman to sue "some person other than the employer."
Therefore, the master was necessarily excluded from liability by section 905,' which states that the liability of the employer under the
144 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 901-950 (1952).

2 50 Wn.2d 557, 313 P.2d 675 (1957).
344 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 905 (1952). "The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the employee, his legal representative....
4 Ginnis v. Southerland, 50 Wn.2d at 558, 313 P.2d 675 (1957): "The privity
between principal and agent is expressed in the ancient maxim qui facit per alium facit
per se. Therefore, the master's negligent act was the act of the Grace Lines, Inc., and
appellants were not injured by the act of some person other than the employer."
544 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 933a (1952).
"If on account of a disability or
death for which compensation is payable under this chapter the person entitled to such
compensation determines that some person other than the employer is liable in damages,
he may elect, by giving notice to the deputy commissioner in such manner as the
Secretary may provide, to receive such compensation or to recover damages against
such third persons."
6 Note 3 supra.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[SUMMER

act is exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to
the employee.
The liability of fellow employees is not specifically covered by the
federal act. The Washington court partially fills this gap in the statute
by an application of the theory of respondeat superior. Since the usual
result in the application of this doctrine is the establishment of the
employer's liability rather than the exemption of the employee from
liability, the theory of the court, that an employee is immune if his
employer is immune, imports an unusual twist to the theory.
The abolition of a worker's common-law right of action against a
co-worker who negligently harms him depends, obviously, on an interpretation of the statute.' Since the longshoremen's act does not specifically abolish this right, the Washington court's decision rests on a
determination that the statute impliedly requires this result. It is
submitted that the determination of the implications of the act should
rest upon an analysis of its purposes and policies rather than upon a
conceptualistic adaptation of the doctrine of respondeat superior. In
most states having compensation statues, the immunity to common law
suits is extended only to the employer in the absence of a specific
statutory provision.' The reason most often cited for this position is
that in the exchange for sure and swift compensation the worker has
given up the right to sue his employer but not his fellow employee,
because the fellow employee is not a party to such an agreement and
has given up nothing in return for such an immunity.9
It would appear that a contrary view should not be adopted unless
to permit the action would defeat the purpose of the compensation act.
It is quite possible that the Washington court has attributed to the
longshoremen's act the same purpose that lies behind the Washington
Workmen's Compensation Act.10 The Washington act declares that
the purpose of the act is to withdraw all phases of the workman's
injuries from private controversy except as provided for in the act,1
and the act specifically exempts the fellow employee from third party
actions."
There is no comparable provision in the federal act indicating such
7 Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 Atl. 130 (1929). Contra, Landrum v. Middaugh,
171 Ohio St 608, 160 N.E. 691 (1927). (Where the court held that a foreman in a
factory was the alter ego of the employer and exempt from liability.)
8 2 LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,

9 Ibid.
10 RCW 51.04.
11 RCW 51.04.010.

12 RCW 51.24.010.

§ 72 et seq.
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a purpose, and the federal courts have not imputed this to it. These
courts, in discussing various other common law rights of action by the
injured longshoreman, have stated that the act was intended to enlarge,
not restrict, the worker's rights, 8 thereby sustaining a plausible inference that the cause of action against the fellow employee is not
excluded.
It is evident that subjecting the fellow employee to a tort action
does not hamper the remedial effects of the statute, since compensation
is always available. It can be argued, however, that the burden of
compensation would then be shifted from the employer to the negligent co-worker because of the provision permitting the subrogation
of the injured employee's rights against third persons to the employer
upon acceptance of compensation under the statute. 4 In those jurisdictions that sustain the liability of the fellow employee, this subrogation is permitted against the negligent co-worker. 5 The underlying
basis is to permit the ultimate loss to fall on those persons responsible,
"Seas
3
Shipping v. Seiracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1945), (The court held the owner of a
vessel liable as a third party under maritime law to a longshoreman working for a
stevedore because of the lack of seaworthiness of the vessel) ; The Pacific Pine, 31
F.2d 152 (1929), (The injured longshoreman working for a stevedoring company
could sue the vessel as a third party over the objection that the remedies in the longshoreman's act were exclusive. The court compared the longshoremen's act with section 5, page 356, of the Laws of Washington, 1911 (RCW 51.32.010), which states
that payment of compensation to an injured worker shall be in lieu of any and all
rights of action whatsoever against any person whomsoever, and stated that, in the
longshoremen's act there appeared no all-inclusive sweeping aside of old rights and
remedies.); Rederii v. Jarka Corp., 26 F. Supp. 304 (1939), (The employer of an
injured stevedore raised the objection that the workman could not proceed against a
vessel as a third person in the act because his remedies under the act were exclusive;
therefore, the vessel's owner, who had been held liable in a third party action to the
injured longshoreman, could not maintain an action of indemnity against the workman's employer. The court held in permitting the action that the workman's remedies
were not restricted by the act, but enlarged.) Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F2d 811 (D.C.
Circ. 1950), cert. den., 340 U.S. 852 (1950) (The court held that a wife has a cause
of action for loss of consortium against the employer even though her injured husband
,was covered by the longshoremen's act. The court held that section 905 did not
preclude her cause of action because it was a separate claim although it arose from the
same facts that would have excluded an action against the defendant employer by the
longshoreman.).
1444 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 933(b) (1952). "Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation order filed by the deputy commissioner shall
operate as an assignment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages against such third person."; 44 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33
U.S.C., 933(b) (1952). "Such employer on account of such assignment may institute
proceedings for the recovery of such damages or may compromise with such third
person either without or after instituting such proceedings."; Seas Shipping v. Seiracki,
328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946).
15 2 LAnsEN, WoRnxlAN's COMPENSATION, § 72.10.
16 A later case in the Ohio jurisdiction, Morrow v. Hume, 131 Ohio St 319, 3 N.E.2d
39 (1936), permitted an employee, covered by workmen's compensation, to sue a fellow
employee who was driving a car negligently which the injured workman was riding in.
The court distinguished the prior Landruin case on the grounds that the fellow
employee was not in the direct control of the immune employer, although he was admit-
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after the initial policy of providing sure relief to the employee has
been fulfilled. That such a basis underlies the longshoremen's act is
apparent from the subrogation provision. Since the fellow employee
is not a party to the immunity granted by the compensation act, having
given up nothing to warrant such an immunity, it would seem that
he does not stand in any different relationship than would another
third party as to the ultimate loss.
Conceivably, the court's decision is not so broad that it exempts
all fellow employees. The factual pattern before the court concerned
the master of the vessel. In future litigation it can be logically contended that the exemption applies only to those employees who hold
a supervisory or managerial position."0
Until the federal courts adopt a contrary position to that of the
Washington court, at least the supervisory fellow employee of the
injured workman is exempted from common law liability in tort under
the longshoremen's act in Washington.
Third Party Tort Action by a Workman Under the Industrial
Insurance Act Against a Physician for Malpractice. The Washington court in Shortridge v. Bede' has determined that an injured workman covered by the Washington Industrial Insurance Act 2 can sue
a physician for malpractice incurred during treatment of a pre-existing injury. Shortridge, the workman, suffered a bilaterial hernia while
in the course of his employment. He contacted an independent physician, the respondent Bede. In an operation for the repair of the hernia,
a vasectomy was performed, that is, his spermatic ducts were mistakenly tied or severed without his consent, causing him to become sterile.
On discovery of his condition, he elected to sue the respondent in
tort.3 The superior court sustained a demurrer on the basis of Ross v.
Erickson Construction Co.4 The Washington supreme court overruled the demurrer.
Prior to the present case, it was commonly thought that the Ross
case 5 made a physician totally immune from a tort action by a worker
for malpractice, when the injury caused by the physician occurred
tedly in the employer's course of business. This case illustrates the artificial distinctions that are possible under the conceptualistic approach taken by the earlier Ohio
case and the Ginnis case in Washington.
1151 Wash. Dec. 356, 319 P.2d 277 (1957).
2 RCW 51.04 et-seq.
3 RCW 5124.010.
4 89 Wash. 634, 155 Pac. 153 (1916).
5 See note 4 supra.
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during treatment of a prior injury sustained in the course of employment by a worker covered by the compensation statute. 6 In that case
the worker, injured while in the course of employment, went to a
physician who had a contract to do surgical and hospital work for
the construction company. After treatment of the injury the worker
made a claim under the industrial insurance law and accepted a final
award. Subsequently he brought an action for damages against the
physician based on malpractice. The court, on appeal, denied recovery,
stating that the Industrial Insurance Act abolished all common law
remedies for a workman's injuries except those expressly preserved by
the act." In the Ross case, the court mentioned only that provision
preserving common law recovery for intentional torts.' No mention
was made of the predecessor of RCW 51.24.010, which preserves negligence actions against third parties, except the worker's employer or
his fellow employees. The court stated that surgical treatment was an
incident to every case of injury or accident. The injury due to the
malpractice of the physician therefore was not an independent injury.
Since the statute abolished all common law remedies, there could be
no recovery for malpractice outside of compensation under the statutory provisions.
This decision was followed without discussion in Carmichael v.
Kirkpatrick,' a case involving an action based on malpractice of a
physician who rendered treatment to the worker in accordance with a
medical aid contract with the employer. The action was dismissed on
the basis of the Ross case.
The court in the present case distinguished the Ross case on two
grounds. The first ground was that the doctor in the Ross case was
employed by the employer to render medical aid to the employees,
whereas the physician in the instant case was an independent doctor.
This distinction is important because RCW 51.24.010 prohibits third
party actions by a workman against persons in the same employ. The
second ground was that the worker in the Ross case had submitted a
claim and had accepted a final award compensating him for both injuries. In the instant case the worker had not accepted compensation
for any disability caused by the vasectomy, although apparently he
had received compensation for time loss caused by the hernia.
The court pointed out that the Ross case did not mention the provi6 2 LARSEN, WoRKMEN'S COUXPENSATION,

7RCW 51.04.010.
RCW 5124.020.
0185 Wash. 609, 56 P2d 686 (1936).

§ 72.60.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[SUMME

sion permitting third party actions which then existed 0 and exists
now. 11 Thus, the court concluded that the third party provision permits an action by the employee against the physician who negligently
causes him harm during treatment for a compensable injury.
The decision by the court in the present case puts Washington in
line with the majority of other jurisdictions which permit third party
actions against physicians for malpractice. 2 The result of the Shortridge case seems logical and correct. As the court pointed out, the
physicians bear none of the costs of the compensation and there can
be no inference that they were intended to share in its immunity. The
construction of the statute by the Washington court is in line with the
action of the 1957 Legislature, which omitted the immunity clause in
RCW 51.24.010 for all third parties except the injured workmen's
employer and his employees.
The Shortridge case, however, leaves unanswered two very important
questions. What will be the result where the physician is under a
contract with the employer to render medical and surgical aid to the
employees? This is one of the distinctions the court draws between
the Shortridge case and the Ross case, although the court in the Ross
case did not consider this point. Presumably, the question is still open
in Washington.
The second question is: What will be the result when compensation
has been given for a disability caused by an industrial injury and the
degree of disability is subsequently increased by reason of negligent
medical treatment by a physician?
THEODORE 0. ToRVw

10 Laws,

1911, Chapter 74, sec. 3.
11 RCW 51.24.010.

122 LARSEN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 72.60.
13 The 1957 Legislature amended RCW 51.24.010 by deleting the following proviso:
"Provided, That no action may be brought against any employer or any workman
under this title as a third person if, at the time of the accident, such employer or such
workman was in the course of any extrahazardous employment under this title."

